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1. Preamble  
In a recent defense of analyticity, Paul Boghossian (1997) mentions 
the apparent paradox that, even though most philosophers of language 
today reject the Quinean skepticism about meaning on which it is 
based, many more appear to share his doubts about the ana-
lytic/synthetic divide.1 Boghossian himself appears unduly influenced 
by Quine’s criticism, because, while he does vindicate analyticity in 
an epistemological sense, he coincides with Quine that analyticity in a 
metaphysical sense – “truth in virtue of meaning” – is not even intelli-
gible. Boghossian’s characterization of the two conceptions of analy-
ticity is curiously asymmetric: in the epistemological sense, a state-
ment is analytic “provided that grasp of its meaning alone suffices for 
justified belief in its truth.” In the metaphysical sense, a statement is 
analytic provided that “it owes its truth value completely to its meaning, 
 
* Financial support for my work was provided by the DGI, Spanish Govern-
ment, research project FFI2010-16049, and through the award “ICREA Academia” 
for excellence in research, 2008, funded by the Generalitat de Catalunya; and by 
the European Community's Seventh Framework Programme FP7/2007-2013 under 
grant agreement no. 238128. Thanks to Gillian Russell for very useful comments 
on a previous version that avoided several misunderstandings (even though of 
course I am responsible for remaining mistakes), to Teresa Marques for her edito-
rial suggestions and to Michael Maudsley for the grammatical revision. 
1 This might have changed meanwhile, perhaps as a result of his article, for, ac-
cording to the PhilPapers survey (http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl), more 
than 60% of philosophers favor an analytic-synthetic distinction. Or perhaps that 
was a misperception, shared in that case with others; cf. also the metasurvey, 
http://philpapers.org/surveys/metaresults.pl. 
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and not at all to ‘the facts’” (1997, 334) One should have expected a 
characterization of the latter sense rather along these lines: a statement 
is analytic provided that facts constitutive of its meaning what it does suffice 
for, or ground, its truth; after all, there are also facts about meaning, to 
which analytic statements surely owe their truth. Moreover, a vindi-
cation of analyticity in the epistemological sense, one would have 
thought, should lead immediately to a vindication of it also in a meta-
physical sense: if grasp of meaning suffices for justified belief in the 
truth of a statement, this must surely be because the facts about 
meaning so grasped are adequately connected with the truth of the 
statement, so as to provide epistemic justification that it is true.  
Be that as it may, Boghossian’s criticism of analyticity in the meta-
physical sense is compelling, and widely shared by other philoso-
phers; Lycan (1994) and Bonjour (1998), among many others, make 
similar points. In a nutshell, the criticism goes as follows. The fact 
that a certain sentence expresses a true proposition is, in a straightfor-
ward sense, a matter of linguistic stipulation: to that extent, linguistic 
assignment of meaning results in truth. But this does not distinguish 
the truth of some statements (the analytic ones) from that of others 
(the synthetic ones): all statements owe their truth to linguistic 
stipulation in that sense. It is quite a different matter whether “the 
truth or a priori justifiability of the proposition thus expressed is itself 
somehow a result of such a convention” (Bonjour 1998, p. 54). This 
cannot be right: the truth-value of a necessary and a priori justifiable 
proposition cannot depend on our relating it to any particular sentence, 
nor can its modal or epistemic status; for the straightforward depend-
ence of sentential truth on linguistic stipulation is a contingent and 
empirical matter. 
This work boldly confronts this “two-factor” argument, together 
with additional ones in the literature, providing answers that at the 
very least merit consideration by philosophers interested in those 
topics (all philosophers, one would have said). The proposals are 
clearly presented, nuanced, and they contemplate in depth the differ-
ent aspects of the issues, including the most prominent historical 
ones; thus, before anything else, I unreservedly recommend it to all 
interested readers. It is also a pleasure to read. 
The book has three parts. In the first, the positive view is pre-
sented, in three chapters explicating respectively the nature of the “in 
virtue of” relation, the kinds of meanings to which the account ap-
peals, and related modal matters, topped with a technical appendix 
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presenting a Kaplan-style formal system which gives a more precise 
presentation of the views about meaning on which the account relies. 
The second part confronts arguments against analyticity, from the 
perspective of the positive view previously outlined, again in three 
chapters: one about the arguments in “Two Dogmas”; a second about 
arguments concerning definition-based analyticity; and a final one on 
an assorted variety of criticisms: vagueness, indeterminacy of meaning 
and translation, externalism and others. The final part confronts 
epistemological matters concerning the kind of justification, if any, 
offered by analyticity; here the author’s views are slightly less devel-
oped, though interesting and worth reflecting upon even so.2 
In what follows, I will discuss some of Russell’s claims and raise a 
few critical points. 
2. Character, sense and reference-determiners 
Russell’s central idea to dispose of the two-factor argument against 
metaphysical analyticity by Boghossian and others outlined above is to 
distinguish different levels of meaning, something that contemporary 
philosophy of language, mainly through the work of Kaplan (1989), 
has already made us familiar with.3 The two-factor argument assumes 
that truth-bearers are propositions, abstract non-linguistic items that 
have essentially their truth-values with respect to a given world. The 
argument does show that these are not acceptable candidates for truth 
in virtue of meaning. However, we can consider other truth-bearers, 
such as (interpreted) (utterances of) sentences (more about the need 
for the parenthetical qualifications below); and other aspects of 
meaning, such as Kaplan’s character, which prima facie is a good candi-
date to account, for instance, for the truth of (English) utterances of 
 
2 It is a pity, especially concerning this last part, that (to all appearances) the 
book was composed before the impact of Williamson’s (2007) forceful objections 
to analyticity was felt, and so they are not discussed.  
3 Russell grants that all truths, analytic truths included, are not just true in vir-
tue of meaning, but also in virtue of “the world” or “the (non-linguistic) facts”. She 
has a useful discussion of the “in virtue of” relation (pp. 29-37), where she explains 
that we can nonetheless talk of truth just in virtue of the meaning-factor when the 
value of the “world”-factor does not make any difference – as in the case of one of 
the arguments for the multiplication function when the other argument is 0. 
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‘I am here now’.4 Russell, however, like Kaplan and many others, 
does not think that proper names and natural kind terms have charac-
ters like indexicals do – rules that (if everything goes well) determine 
a referent given features of the context of utterance. She would 
nevertheless like to count some sentences as analytic in virtue of 
meaning-features of those expressions – she offers as an example 
‘Mohammed Ali is Cassius Clay’, uttered under the assumption that 
‘Mohammed Ali’ has been introduced “to refer to whatever object, if 
any, ‘Cassius Clay’ refers to” (pp. 58-9).5  
In order to do this, Russell appeals to a meaning-feature which, 
she contends, coincides with character in the case of indexicals such as 
‘I’, but can be something else in the case of proper names and natural 
kind terms: a “reference-determiner”, which she initially defines as a 
“condition which an object must meet in order to be the referent of, 
or fall in the extension of, an expression” (p. 46). According to her, 
while the referent of an indexical is given by a character-rule relative 
to a context of utterance, the referent of a proper name (or a natural 
kind term) is given by a condition such as the bright speck on the horizon 
on such and such an evening relative to a “context of introduction”: the 
one in which “the word is introduced to the language in the first 
place”. 
To develop the suggestion that analyticity is truth in virtue of refer-
ence determiner, Russell provides, as a first pass, a modal definition of 
analyticity (p. 56):  a sentence is true in virtue of meaning iff, for all 
pairs of context of introduction and context of utterance, the proposi-
tion it expresses is true with respect to the context of evaluation. 
Modal definitions such as this are subject to well-known objections 
which, as Russell correctly points out, appear to be quite general in 
that they affect a whole variety of them, be they accounts of disposi-
tions, belief, or what have you. In this case, clear counterexamples 
are “substantive necessities”, such as mathematical claims, particularly 
complex ones (the Continuum Hypothesis or its negation, whatever is 
true, say). I will discuss the final proposal in the next section, but first 
 
4 This is a point that my colleague Pérez-Otero and I also make in our own de-
fense of metaphysical analyticity (conventional truths, in some cases) against 
Boghossian and others; cf. García-Carpintero, M. & Pérez-Otero, M. (2009). 
5 García-Carpintero & Pérez-Otero (2009, 260-1) discuss similar examples in-
volving proper names and corresponding nicknames, such as ‘Robert’ and ‘Bob’ or  
‘Manuel’ and ‘Manolo’.  
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I would like to make a critical point about characters and reference-
determiners, and the bearers of analyticity. 
Russell says that “in the case of an indexical such as I” the reference 
determiner “is part of the meaning”, i.e., the character;6 but I have 
difficulty in making sense of this. As we have seen, reference-
determiners are by definition conditions that an object must meet to 
be the referent of an expression.7 Now, characters are primarily 
properties of expression-types; but expression-types such as ‘I’ are 
not intended to have referents: only tokens of them (types-in-
context) are. Even if the character of the type that a token instantiates 
is in some sense “part of” the token’s reference-determiner, the latter 
cannot be identified with the former: it goes beyond the character, in 
that it involves the specific context of instantiation – the token itself, 
on token-reflexive accounts.8  
The problem at the root of this perplexity lies with the election of 
the bearers of analyticity and related properties. If sentences – the 
official bearers of analyticity in the book – are just types, none of the 
alleged examples of analyticity would stand even a prima facie chance. 
Consider ‘Mohammed Ali is Cassius Clay’. By choosing this example, 
as opposed to others which would have served equally – such as 
‘Manolo is Manuel’ (uttered on the assumption that ‘Manolo’ is 
intended to refer as a conventional nickname corresponding to the 
name of the particular Manuel we are talking about) – Russell can 
easily describe reference-fixing contexts for ‘Cassius Clay’ and ‘Mo-
hammed Ali’ immediately suggesting to the audience a particular 
interpretation, unlike ‘Manuel’, and thus she can spare herself a 
qualification such as the one I just made about the interpretation of 
the case of ‘Manuel’ on which that of the case of ‘Manolo’ depends.9 
 
6  Cf. also p. 156, and fn. 18 below. 
7 This initial definition is modified later (p. 98), with the aim of excluding circu-
lar and derived conditions, but this does not affect the points I will make. 
8 García-Carpintero (1998) defends token-reflexive accounts of indexicals and 
demonstratives from Kaplan’s criticism. In general, Russell appears to share 
Kaplan’s penchant for abstract semantics free from the vagaries of messy psycho-
logical facts, but I do not think truth-conditional semantics can survive that (cf. 
footnote 10), nor that it is necessary in order to motivate a mathematically precise 
formal system. 
9 “We’ll stipulate, in order to have a clear example, that the name Cassius Clay 
was introduced when Cassius Clay’s parents baptized him (Let’s call him (pointing) 
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But, of course, there are, or might be, many people called ‘Cassius 
Clay’, and the reference-determiner for ‘Ali’ in the example Russell 
would like to count as analytic depends as much on just a concrete 
interpretation (which her reference-fixing stipulations provide) as in 
the ‘Manolo’ example. Hence it must at most be sentences taken under 
specific interpretations, i.e., taking relative to a concrete reference-fixer that 
are or aren’t analytic. 
Now, in the case of indexicals, it is only sentences-in-context, or 
utterances, whose referential expressions have referents and, there-
fore, which as a whole have contents.10 Russell grants an objection 
that, in effect, proper names show that reference determiners are not 
meanings, even if they are constrained by meanings (p. 67); but the 
point applies to all reference-determiners, not just those of proper 
names.11 If we consider demonstratives such as ‘here’, the point is 
clear (but I think it applies also to “pure indexicals” such as ‘I’, ‘now’, 
 
‘Cassius Clay’.) The referent of Mohammed Ali was introduced in a slightly different 
way, when Elijah Muhammad, the leader of the Nation of Islam, said Let’s use 
‘Mohammed Ali’ to name Cassius Clay. Mohammed Ali thus refers to whatever object, if 
any, Cassius Clay refers to.” (p. 58-9). 
10 Russell will say, I assume (cf. also fn. 20) that indexical sentences have a se-
mantic property, character, so that ‘I am here now’ – even if, as a sentence-type, it 
is not properly called true or false, nor the expressions ‘I’, ‘here’ and ‘now’ in it 
properly ascribed a referent – has the interesting property of being “true whenever 
uttered” – true in virtue of character; and that it is this that she takes analyticity to 
be. But then, she should not assimilate ‘Mohammed Ali is Cassius Clay’ to it; this 
sentence is not true no matter what the “context of introduction” is: as indicated in the 
main text, we have to fix a specific interpretation of ‘Cassius Clay’, with a particu-
lar “reference-determiner”, for that to be plausible. I suggest below in the main text 
to put aside Kaplan’s notion of the sentence-type ‘I am here now’ being true 
whenever uttered, and consider instead the property of an utterance of that sentence 
(which does have a truth value, and whose referential expressions do have referents 
and therefore reference-determiners) of having a necessary diagonal. It is the latter 
notion that is required to assimilate to it ‘Mohammed Ali is Cassius Clay’. A related 
issue is whether we would then need “contexts of introduction”, or we may do, as I 
suggest below in the main text, with contexts of utterance. 
11 She thinks fully-fledged reference-determiners belong in the “metasemantics”, 
not the semantics proper. I do not think that is the proper classification, but, be that 
as it may, when the point is generalized to indexicals as suggested below, it shows – 
as many researchers have claimed – that the semantics proper gives us less in the 
way of fully-fledged truth-conditions than some philosophers still think (cf. García-
Carpintero 2006a). 
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‘here’ or ‘today’). In offering her pet example, ‘I am here now’, 
Russell alludes to the problem posed by true instances of ‘I am not 
here now’ uttered by recording machines, etc (p. 22), disregarding it 
for the sake of easy exposition. Let us suppose that we account for 
these cases by thinking of utterances as “utterance bombs” (Egan 
2009): the speaker arranges for an utterance relative to which indexi-
cals are to be interpreted to be “detonated” in her absence.12 I think 
that, on the basis of an account of analyticity along the lines of Rus-
sell’s based on “reference-determiners”, it is still justified to count 
more ordinary utterances of ‘I am here now’ as analytic; so I think it 
is acceptable for her to put aside those cases. But they do make it 
more glaringly obvious that it is not just the linguistic meaning, or 
character, of the indexicals that is doing the relevant “reference-
fixing” job, but also contextual features including the intentions of the 
speaker: it is not just any utterance of the type that is analytic, but 
only some of them, in virtue of properties of the utterances that (to 
put it in psychological terms) speakers do not access just thanks to 
their core “language faculty”, but deploying their full “intentional-
conceptual” capacities. 
Once we are clear about this, I think we can obtain a simplification 
of Russell’s proposal – even if one she would not accept.13 I under-
stand that Russell is convinced by Millian considerations concerning 
the working of proper names, but some writers have forcefully 
defended “causal descriptivist” accounts that would make a natural fit 
with her proposal.14 On the version that I prefer, causal-
communication chains individuate proper names: different chain, 
different (interpreted) word-type, in that they rely on independent 
introductory conventions.15 Each different proper name has a differ-
 
12 Other accounts of these cases would allow me to make the same points, muta-
tis mutandis. 
13 Apparently others have made similar suggestions to her previously, and she 
declares not to like them (p. 114). I am not at all convinced by the reasons she 
provides, as I will explain below. 
14 I myself have defended such approaches cf. García-Carpintero (2000 and 
2006b). 
15 Madagascar-like cases only show that the “initial baptisms” creating a commu-
nication chain and thus contributing to the individuation of names might be inadver-
tent; cf. Sainsbury 2005, 119-122). 
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ent character-like meaning; the character is a rule that assigns to any 
given token the object – if any – responsible for the initiation of the 
communication chain. Such a character might include specific infor-
mation, such as that the object is whatever ‘Cassius Clay’ refers to, or 
a bright speck in such-and-such a position on the evening horizon. 
This will not sensibly be considered part of the “semantics” of the 
language.16 But this will be as little an obstacle to the analyticity of 
some utterances of ‘Mohammed Ali is Cassius Clay’ as it was in the 
case of ‘I am here now’: the case of indexicals already establishes that 
(a) only constituents of utterances have reference-determiners, (b) 
only utterances are analytic or otherwise, and (c) it is not just the 
semantics proper that accounts for it, but contextually idiosyncratic 
features too.  
There are epistemological issues about this which are related to 
the phenomenon of semantic deference: we may regard speakers who 
ignore the dependence of ‘Mohammed Ali’ on ‘Cassius Clay as none-
theless competent. Among other possibilities, this can be handled by 
distinguishing semantic competence in the ordinary sense – which 
admits of deference-based understanding for an indefinite number of 
expressions, to the extent that one fully understand others and knows 
oneself to be part of a linguistic community – from full competence, 
which requires knowledge of the reference-determiner.17 The inter-
esting epistemological consequences of analyticity, to be discussed in 
the final section, would require the latter, and thus (as with almost 
any other form of a priori knowledge discussed in the literature) 
would fully obtain only under ideal circumstances. 
Russell criticizes the “identification of contexts of introduction 
with contexts of utterance” in such a proposal, but I do not find her 
reasons convincing. The first is that “it is hard to believe that the 
reference determiner for a name somehow gets to be sensitive to the 
context in which the name is uttered, especially when speakers gen-
erally don’t know the reference determiners for the names they use” 
 
16  In the case of proper names, only very general features such as that they are 
referential expressions that behave in the outlined way can be plausibly considered 
part of the semantics proper, and in that sense it is I think correct to say that specific 
proper names are not “part of the language”. 
17 Russell herself suggests something like this for general terms, pp. 206-7; but I 
expect she would reject any such view of semantic competence for names, in favor 
of a Millian view. 
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(p. 115). This is to a certain extent correct, in view of the already 
mentioned phenomenon of semantic deference. But I do not think it 
matters, for the proposal we are considering will assign competent 
speakers tacit knowledge of the causal-historical mechanism fixing the 
reference of proper names, so that they do tacitly know at least that 
the referent of a given token of a proper name uttered in a context is 
the object, if any, present in the “initial baptism” starting the chain 
leading to that token, even if they have no further details of that 
baptism; to that extent, they do know that “the reference determiner 
for a name somehow gets to be sensitive to the context in which the 
name is uttered”.  
The second criticism relies on a version of the Twin Earth thought 
experiment in which Twin Earth is not a counterfactual Earth but a 
distant planet. She correctly points out that the intuition to be ac-
counted for is that our own uses of ‘water’ there, or relative to it, 
would still refer to H2O, not to XYZ, and she contends that this 
disqualifies the proposal: “it follows that the reference determiner for 
water is not sensitive to the context of utterance – if it were, water 
would have to pick out XYZ” (p. 116). But here Russell is assuming 
an excessively coarse understanding of what a context of utterance is. 
It is only in an irrelevant sense that Twin Earth is the “context of 
utterance” in this case: it just happens to be the place in which the 
utterance takes place. But such a place need not even be the place of 
the context required to interpret utterances of ‘here’, if uttered 
demonstratively pointing to a place in a map, say. The relevant fea-
ture of the context of utterance to interpret a use of a proper name or 
a natural kind term includes the causal chain of communication lead-
ing to the use of the name or term in the context – in this case the 
one brought with him by the speaker from his acquisition of the term 
on Earth. 
Russell’s first-stab modal definition of analyticity mentioned above 
assumes that it is sentences, not utterances, that are bearers of the 
property. However, there is an analogous property of utterances, 
namely, the necessity of the (relevant) corresponding diagonal propo-
sition (García-Carpintero 2006b). No matter what one thinks of this 
alternative proposal, it is I think useful to realize that different con-
temporary theories of Fregean sense or so-called primary intensions 
understand those notions in ways that do not differ significantly from 
reference-determiners, understood as possessing features (a)-(c) a 
few paragraphs back, and are not exposed to the objections I have 
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raised. An account of analyticity in virtue of reference-determiners 
generalized along the lines suggested should make predications such 
as ‘she is female’ or ‘Hesperus is visible in the evening’ analytic as 
well – at least putting aside qualms about the existence of the in-
tended referents.18 Thus, even if I have found problematic features in 
Russell’s core suggestions about analyticity concerning the bearers of 
the property and the distinction between contexts of introduction and 
contexts of utterance, I do think they point in the right direction. But 
now we have to confront the problems already mentioned for the 
initial modal characterization, which would equally affect an account 
in terms of diagonal propositions. 
3. Metaphysical analyticity as containment and exclusion 
Russell usefully relates the problems of the initial modal characteriza-
tion of analyticity to problems for other modal characterizations of 
notions such as content, character or direct reference; accounts in terms of 
modal constancy, such as the rigidity account of direct reference, fail 
to capture these notions, because they apply to entities which intui-
tively do not have them (‘the even number’ or ‘the actual inventor of 
the zip’ are rigid, but not directly referential). Directly referential 
expressions are rigid, but not all rigid expressions are directly refer-
ential; we could say that it is direct reference that explains rigidity in 
some cases, but rigidity cannot in any way account for direct refer-
ence. She purports to provide a characterization of analyticity that 
stands to the one in terms of modal constancy given above as the 
fundamental idea of direct reference – contributing an object to the 
proposition – stands to attempts at characterizing it in terms of rigid-
ity (p. 82). This is another of the many valuable suggestions in the 
book. 
Her proposal is inspired by the traditional Kantian notion of analy-
ticity as containment of the predicate-concept in the subject-concept, 
capable of standing up to the influential Fregean criticism that there 
are sentences that should have the same property as those that are the 
 
18 Russell appears to assume a Fregean neutral free logic, on which all sentences 
including vacuous referring expressions (including, say, if Vulcan exists, Vulcan is 
identical to itself’) are neither true nor false (p. 64). I do not think this is the best 
option; but this is another matter for which she does not provide an explicit justifi-
cation of her assumptions, so I cannot go into it any further. 
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model for this view (‘bodies are extended’), which cannot be ac-
counted for by dividing them into subject-concept and predicate-
concept in any plausible way. In order to do that, she assumes that 
there are objective ways of ascribing logical forms to sentences, 
distinguishing in them “parts” such as “logical modifiers”, “logical 
subjects” and “logical predicates”. Let us grant this, although once 
again a more extended discussion should have been provided than the 
one we actually get, explaining how these notions fit with contempo-
rary linguistics. Also, Russell grants to the Fregean objection that 
containment of the reference-determiner for the predicate in the 
determiner for the subject would not account for all cases of analytic-
ity; to account for the analyticity of ‘no bachelor is married’, we need 
to appeal also to a relation of exclusion among reference-determiners 
(p. 95). Finally, she wants to extend the account from the analyticity 
of truth to that of validity, at least in some cases of the basic schemes 
in Gentzen-like natural deduction calculi – such as Modus Ponens, 
Conjunction Elimination or Universal Quantifier Instantiation (101-2) – 
which other writers, starting with Gentzen himself, have considered 
meaning-constitutive for the logical constants.  
I have strong misgivings about Russell’s proposals here, even 
though I admire her resolve in tackling them head-on – i.e., purport-
ing to be as informative as possible about how meaning, understood 
as so far discussed, grounds the truth of analytic statements, given that 
a modal account of this will not do. I have two relatively minor 
reservations and a major one. Firstly, although she alludes to contem-
porary linguistics to validate the objectivity of her grammatical pars-
ings of sentences – and this is as it should be – it is not at all clear to 
me that any contemporary linguistic theory would validate decisions 
that are essential for her account to work in some cases, such as 
taking the connective ‘if … then’ to be the “modifier” in sentences of 
the form if S then S, with the sentence S being first the logical subject 
and then the logical predicate, or ‘having less money than’ the modi-
fier and the pair ‘poor people’, ‘rich people’ the logical subject and 
logical predicate in ‘poor people have less money than rich people’. 
This is one more crucial juncture at which Russell’s option of ignor-
ing the complexities of a full-fledged account is unfortunate. Sec-
ondly, even granting her decisions about logical form, I do not think 
she provides a full reply to the Fregean objection to accounts in the 
spirit of Kant’s like hers. For instance, I cannot see how instances of 
excluded middle are accounted for in her proposal; but I think she 
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would concur that a proper account of analyticity should include in 
the category instances of excluded middle and other fundamental 
logical principles as well as ‘bachelors are married men’.  
Worrying as these two objections are, there is an even more deci-
sive one. The main problem is, I think, that the crucial notions to 
which the account appeals – relations of containment and exclusion 
among reference-determiners – are, if undefined, merely figurative, 
and therefore cannot do any proper explanatory work. By way of 
further elucidation beyond the pre-theoretical metaphorical under-
standing, Russell relates those notions to modal features (pp. 93-5), 
so that this is, in effect, the most that we do properly understand. 
What is it for the reference-determiner of an instance of a universal 
generalization to be contained in the reference-determiner of the 
universal generalization? The only thing I feel I decently understand 
by this is the modal characterization, that the former would be true in 
circumstances determined by any pair of context of utterance and 
introduction relative to which the latter is true. The same applies, 
mutatis mutandis, to relations of exclusion among reference determin-
ers. Thus, ultimately Russell’s proposal does not provide any proper 
explanation beyond that provided by the modal account; and she 
herself has already shown that to be insufficient, on account of the 
already mentioned general insufficiencies of those accounts. Hence, I 
do not think she really meets her goal of providing an account that 
stands to modal constancy as direct reference stands to rigidity. 
So, what can the friend of analyticity do, as an alternative? At a 
general level, I think we cannot say much more than Fine (1994) 
suggests, i.e., that analyticity is truth of an interpreted item in virtue 
of the essence of some of its constituents meanings (after having 
clarified along the lines that Russell does, or the variation I have 
defended in the first section, what sort of meanings we are appealing 
to here); this assumes Fine’s view that the general failures of modal 
accounts that Russell points out result in general from misconceived 
attempts at explaining essence in terms of its mere modal conse-
quences. This is to be elaborated in a more specific detail on a case-
by-case basis, explaining in particular cases how it is that the nature of 
the relevant aspects of the meanings of some expressions, combined 
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with the relevant features of others, fixes the truth-value of the 
sentences in which they occur.19 
4. Ephemeral analyticities 
Russell contends that Kripkean views on proper names and natural 
kind terms allow us to make sense of Quine’s claims about the 
ephemeral or transient character of definition-based analyticities. She 
grants that this is so in some cases, although it just shows that the 
relevant cases were not analytic in the first place; real analyticities are 
not transient or ephemeral. My problems with her discussion here are 
connected with points about character and reference-fixers I already 
made in the first section.20  
She provides as an example “a case where we legislatively intro-
duce a name ‘Sam’ using the following object-language reference-
fixing definition: Sam is the tallest boy in the class” (154). Let as call 
this reference-fixing stipulation ‘SamRF’. Russell makes a series of 
claims about this case which she says “we learnt from Kripke” – claims 
that, she contends, can also be made about related cases for natural 
kind terms, such as ‘water falls from the sky’ – that I find very con-
fusing. One that I do not dispute has to do with the possibility of 
competent uses of ‘Sam’ by speakers who are unaware of the refer-
 
19 This is the strategy García-Carpintero & Pérez-Otero (2009) recommend and 
pursue. 
20 She rejects Quine’s claim that it is not sentences but utterances that might be 
definitional truth (related to the claim I defended above), insisting that it is sen-
tence-types, like ‘I am here now’, that are (eternally) analytic. I have already 
pointed out the problems in this quotation: “analytic sentences, such as I am here now 
… are recognizably analytic because the reference determiners ensure that the 
sentence is true with respect to all contexts of utterance and contexts of introduc-
tion, and speakers may recognize that the sentence is analytic because those refer-
ence determiners are not forgotten by competent speakers: speakers have to know 
that I refers to the agent of the context in order to be competent with the word” 
(156). Competence provides speakers with the character of ‘I’; this is what they do 
not forget; and it may be (putting aside answering machines, etc) that the combined 
characters of the indexicals make it the case that the sentence-type is true with 
respect to all contexts of utterance and introduction. But merely the character does 
not determine the referent of any particular token of ‘here’, say; and speakers will 
easily forget any particular reference-determiner for it, so forgetfulness is irrele-
vant. 
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ence-fixing stipulation SamRF; that again has to do with the well-
established phenomenon of semantic deference, which we have 
already mentioned. However, Russell also says that reference-fixing 
stipulations such as SamRF are “meaning-independent”, because they 
can be replaced by other stipulations without changing the meaning of 
the name (155); and that claims such as ‘Sam is the tallest boy in the 
class’ are not analytic, because “if a giant joined Sam’s class, we 
would be able to utter it falsely” (156).21 Let us critically examine 
these claims in reverse order. 
In the first place, for the latter claim to be true we have to inter-
pret the description without any specific temporal qualification. 
However, taken in that way, nobody in her right mind would use it to 
fix the referent of anything, because there is very little reason to think 
that it will be a proper description, uniquely satisfied. Thus, if it is to 
be a decent candidate for a reference-fixer, we should understand the 
description with the relevant qualifications about the class and time; 
otherwise, we should discuss well-known examples such as ‘Julius’ 
instead, whose reference is fixed with descriptions such as ‘the inven-
tor of the zip’, plausibly taken to be proper without any qualification. 
Now, if precisified in the way suggested, Russell accepts that it would 
be analytic; but she still expresses some misgivings: “but then this 
definition [SamRF] does more than ascribe a referent; it also (implic-
itly) ascribes a reference determiner” (p. 156). And so what? Is not 
this the case with all reference-fixing ascriptions? The question is 
whether an assertion of ‘Julius invented the zip’, or one of ‘Sam is the 
tallest boy in the class’, made on the assumption of the relevant 
reference-fixing stipulations (hence, in the latter case, with the de-
scription understood as precisified with regard to a salient class and 
time), is analytic; and Russell appears to concur, as she should, for 
sheer consistency with what has come before. Thus, firstly Quine 
appears to be right that it is not the sentence, but specific utterances 
of it, made in specific contexts, that are properly counted as analytic. 
And secondly, there is no additional ephemerality or transience in this 
case to that already found in the pet case of ‘I am here now’, when 
properly understood. 
 
21 The very same words ‘Sam is the tallest boy in the class’ can be used to make 
a stipulation such as SamRF, and to make a statement or assertion assuming the 
stipulation. The former is a proposal or an agreement, not properly evaluable as 
true or otherwise; only the latter can be properly counted as analytical, therefore.  
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This disposes also of the other point, about the “meaning inde-
pendence” of stipulations such as SamRF. Millians talk that way, be-
cause they are assuming that the meaning of names is just the refer-
ent; this is what they take to have learnt from Kripke. Russell has 
already convincingly shown that it is not meaning in that sense that 
analyticity can be properly predicated of; it has to be meaning in the 
sense of “reference-fixer” or “reference-determiner”. I have argued 
that it is expressions-in-context that are relevant for ascriptions of 
analyticity, and not just in virtue of relative stable properties of the 
types, but also in virtue of more idiosyncratic, contextually depend-
ent features. Thus, I do not think it is consistent with the view devel-
oped so far, nor intuitive at all, to say that the reference-fixing stipu-
lation for ‘Julius’ is meaning-independent, in the sense of “meaning” 
relevant to analyticity claims: introducing a new stipulation would 
change the meaning of ‘Julius’, even if the new description deter-
mines the same referent. And the same applies to SamRF, when the 
relevant precisifications are made.  
5. The analytic, the a priori and the conventional 
Russell avoids trouble by putting aside the issue of whether the justifi-
cation that analyticity might provide is a priori justification. There are 
three off-putting problems that she points out. Firstly, while the 
bearers of analyticity are linguistic items, those of aprioricity are 
objects of knowledge and belief, therefore propositions. Secondly, 
there is no good account of a priori knowledge: it is knowledge not 
depending on experience, even if experience has played an “enabling” 
role in its acquisition; but the distinction between the enabling and 
justificatory roles of experience is unclear. Finally, there is the 
Quinean issue of how much knowledge (of logic, in particular) is 
needed to derive anything from meaning-ascriptions. So, putting 
aside (not fully, as we will see) whether analytic justification is a priori 
or otherwise, she explores instead whether there is any distinctive 
kind of justification that analyticity might provide. 
She comes up with an interesting suggestion. Knowledge of refer-
ence-determiner, together with disquotational knowledge, puts us in 
a position to acquire some knowledge through fairly basic inferential 
schemes. Thus, knowledge of reference determiner tells us that 
‘bachelor’ applies only to males; disquotational knowledge tells us 
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that ‘bachelor’ applies just to bachelors; and from this it is an easy 
inferential step to the non-linguistic, world-involving conclusion that 
all bachelors are males. In this final section I will discuss two consid-
erations that Russell provides regarding why this sort of justification is 
interesting.  
The first is that, notwithstanding her disclaimers, she points out 
that the justification is in a clear sense a priori: “anyone who knows the 
reference determiners for the expressions they [analytic sentences] 
contain is in a position to work out that the proposition expressed by 
the sentence is true, without undertaking further empirical investiga-
tion” (p. 209). Someone might contend that this is still a posteriori 
justification, because it crucially depends on knowledge of the ascrip-
tion of reference-determiner, which is known from experience. 
Russell has an interesting point to make in reply: “”I could justify my 
belief that all bachelors are men using any language in which bachelor 
has the reference determiner which I thought it had in the English 
dialect – including my own idiolect, or a language fragment I make 
up” (p. 211); “you don’t need experience to justify your beliefs about 
what words mean in your own idiolect – you get to stipulate them, as 
you go along if needs be” (p. 218). Presently I will be questioning her 
claims about stipulation in their full generality; however, the de-
fender of the a priori character of knowledge gained through the kind 
of analytic justification that Russell describes can at the very least use 
her point about the relation between public language and one’s own 
idiolect, insisting that whatever experience is required to understand 
one’s own idiolect plays at most an enabling role in justification, in a 
sufficiently clear-cut sense to allow one to help oneself to the distinc-
tion in this particular case. 
The second consideration I would like to discuss is this: “The truth 
of such attributions [of reference determiners] is, to a large extent, up 
to the linguistic community to decide” (p. 209). We just saw the 
importance she assigns to this alleged stipulative character of ascrip-
tions of reference determiner in her (reluctant) vindication of the a 
priori nature of analytic justification. Now, a successful stipulation is 
in a clear sense a convention; so she sounds here as if she is not just 
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purporting to vindicate metaphysical analyticity – truth in virtue of 
meaning – but also truth by convention.22 
This is a central issue addressed by García-Carpintero & Pérez-
Otero (2009). They argue not only in favor of metaphysical analytic-
ity, but also of truth by convention, in some very limited sense, as 
follows: (i) after we stipulate that ‘flurg’ is to apply to green squares, 
‘all flurgs are green squares’ is an interpreted sentence that semanti-
cally differs from ‘all green squares are green squares’, in that it 
includes a distinctive lexical item for green squares, thereby indicat-
ing that they constitute a salient kind for some purposes; (ii) modulo 
the analyticity of ‘all green squares are green squares’, ‘all flurgs are 
green squares’ is analytic (in a sense very similar to Russell’s, in that 
its truth results from an ascription of reference-fixer); (iii) it is a 
partially conventional truth (and would be fully conventional if ‘all 
green squares are green squares’ were not just analytic, but true by 
convention), because that ascription of reference-fixer is a conven-
tion. Similar points are made about ‘Manolo is identical to Manuel’: it 
differs from ‘Manuel is identical to himself’, in that it depends on a 
specific stipulation making an expression (‘Manolo’) anaphoric on 
another, unlike ‘Manuel is identical to himself’ which is just the 
natural-language instantiation of the reflexivity of identity; it is an 
analytic truth, if instances of a = a are; it is partially conventional, 
and fully conventional if the latter are. 
However, even though they thus vindicate conventional truth in 
this limited sense, they argue that the vindication is very limited. 
Although, they argue, ‘water falls from the sky’ or ‘water fills up the 
rivers, lakes and seas around’ are also analytic in the relevant sense 
(something that, I argued in sections 2 and 4 above, Russell does not 
appear to like, but does follow from her account in terms of refer-
ence-determiner once the misunderstandings about bearers of analy-
ticity, character and reference determiners are cleared up),23 they 
contend that the reference-fixing ascriptions on which they depend, 
 
22 But I cannot be sure, because the matter is not fully addressed in the book; 
we are just given several references to the role of stipulation, without further 
elaboration. 
23 The a priori nature of those claims can also be defended along the lines she 
herself neatly indicates, with the modification I have suggested above to avoid 
reliance on stipulations, given that I do not believe that the relevant reference-fixing 
ascriptions have that character in this case. 
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unlike those for ‘flurg’ (or ‘bachelor’) cannot be considered in any 
way conventional or stipulative. Lexical units such as ‘water’ are 
intended to pick out kinds that are salient because they are natural; 
and it is not at all conventional that we fix reference to them by 
means of those of their features relatively accessible to us that are to 
be explained by whatever constitutes the essence of the kind. An 
indication of this (defeasible, but undefeated in this case, I would 
argue) is that, while it is not to be expected that many linguistic 
communities have a lexical item for green squares, the opposite can 
be said about the substance that falls from the sky and fills up rivers, 
lakes and seas. Although the issue of logic or mathematics is more 
complicated, we suggest that it is prima facie more sensible to classify 
them with the claim about water than with the claim about flurgs. 
Thus, although – against Boghossian – not just the notion of meta-
physical analyticities but also that of conventional truths is intelligible, 
and indeed there are examples of both, critics of conventionalism are 
right when it comes to interesting topics, such as logic or arithmetic. 
My final critical comment is that, at the very least, the claims 
about the stipulative character of analyticities bear more elaboration. 
The inspiration for thinking further about them would be one of the 
many benefits of the close study of this thought-provoking and neces-
sary book.  
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